

Digital Populism and Authority Vacuums: A Case Study of Mining Governance in Bogor Regency

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Abstract:

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Effective governance and policy implementation are foundational to state legitimacy and economic development. In Indonesia, however, informal institutions frequently disrupt formal administrative frameworks. Utilizing a qualitative case study of Class C mining governance within the Rumpin, Cigudeg, and Parungpanjang districts of Bogor Regency, this study examines the structural fractures caused by a rapid administrative re-centralization process. Methodologically, the paper analyzes two contradictory directives issued by West Java Governor Dedi Mulyadi, alongside official demographic databases and contemporary literature. The findings reveal that a sudden policy shift from a production cap to a total operational shutdown created a severe localized authority vacuum. To conceal this underlying lack of technical and supervisory capacity, regional executives deployed abrupt, repressive closures wrapped in a digital discourse of performative populism. Empirical calculations demonstrate that the state's subsequent social relief program targeted a volume covering only 15% of the total households across the affected districts, marginalizing local livelihoods. Ultimately, this study demonstrates that radical regulatory shocks driven by digital populism result in counterproductive administrative failures. The paper urges a strategic pivot toward cultivating internal bureaucratic capacity and constructing genuine material infrastructure to achieve sustainable regional development.

Introduction

National political stability and policy consistency are foundational prerequisites for achieving sustainable economic growth (Kurnia et al., 2024). Consequently, public governance remains a focal point of intense scrutiny from civil society, the mass media, and the academic community. This scrutiny is fundamentally tied to the fact that economic progress serves as a

primary, visible metric of successful state-building, directly validating the state's legitimacy and its institutional monopoly on the legitimate use of violence. Effective governance translates macro-level authority into the tangible delivery of public prosperity, wealth distribution, and institutional services. Conversely, the persistence of social inequality stands as empirical proof of the state's failure to protect marginalized populations (Judijanto, 2026), a dynamic that further delegitimizes state power and potentially precipitates widespread social disorder.

Within the landscape of contemporary Indonesian governance, however, policy implementation and public service delivery remain subjects of intense debate. Scholarly consensus attributes these systemic friction points to an array of persistent bottlenecks, including constrained resource allocations, localized economic dependencies, a lack of cohesive narratives among political executives, sectoral silos, and volatile regional political dynamics (Asriyani et al., 2026; Azzahra et al., 2026; Hitaminah et al., 2026; Masaguni et al., 2025). Internally, state apparatuses face deeply entrenched structural liabilities, most notably subpar human resource capabilities, weak regulatory oversight, and fractured accountability mechanisms (Mayasari et al., 2025; Pecamuya, 2026; Suhada, 2025). These vulnerabilities are frequently exacerbated by the ambitious policy mandates of central authorities, which routinely outpace the technical and operational capacities of localized bureaucrats (Solikhun, 2026).

To remedy these structural deficits, the existing literature widely advocates for a standard suite of technical interventions. These include strengthening preventive oversight, conducting regular policy evaluations, ensuring the structural independence of supervisory agencies, investing in human resource capacity building, maintaining steadfast executive commitment, and leveraging digitalization to maximize bureaucratic transparency (Daryono & Roslianah, 2025; Ekaputra et al., 2025; Iskandar & Pranoto, 2026; Mujahidin & Kusuma, 2025; Nuzula & Handayani, 2026; Safitri et al., 2026; Sarinah et al., 2025).

This focus aligns with classical implementation theory, which historically conceptualizes governance failures as primarily technical, operational, or coordination-based problems. For instance, Sabatier and Mazmanian (1980) argue that short-run policy implementation relies heavily on statutory strength, hierarchical integration, agency commitment, the strategic presence of institutional "fixers," and constituent resources. In the long run, however, shifts in external socio-economic conditions and the capacity of supportive coalitions to intervene become the decisive factors. Within this shifting paradigm, the public manager operates as a strategic actor navigating

a complex "fitness landscape" shared with other agents, subtly manipulating institutional constraints and capitalizing on perceived political openings to ensure organizational survival (Teisman & Klijn, 2008).

Nevertheless, domestic scholarship reveals that the Indonesian context introduces socio-political dynamics that challenge these established Western-centric frameworks. While technical and operational approaches explain certain administrative dynamics, they fail to account for the pervasive influence of informal institutions—such as primordialism and entrenched patronage networks—which frequently subvert formal, streamlined bureaucratic processes. Building on Douglas North's institutional framework, formal institutions comprise constitutions, statutes, explicit regulations, and legal contracts, whereas informal institutions encompass taboos, customs, traditions, conventions, and unwritten codes of conduct. Under optimal conditions, robust informal institutions minimize transaction costs, facilitate collective action in public goods provision, and foster social order without requiring prohibitive state investments in verification and enforcement (Shirley, 2026).

In Indonesia, however, informal institutions frequently manifest through the politicization of cultural symbols, ancestral customs, traditional royal titles, and localized historical narratives. Consequently, these informal frameworks often trigger intense sub-national political infighting as competing factions weaponize primordial ties to claim political legitimacy and capture regional economic sectors (Rahmawati et al., 2025). A vivid expression of this dynamic is visible in the bureaucratic composition of the Pontianak Municipality, where the systemic domination of ethnic Malay elites is maintained through an instrumental combination of historical memory, patronage networks, and cultural engineering via public architecture and state-sponsored traditional celebrations (Ramada & Haboddin, 2025). Beyond elite domination, the subverting influence of informal institutions is also evident in West Sumatra Province, where a comprehensive normative legal framework ultimately devolved into a static, formal planning document rather than serving as a tool for consistent regulatory enforcement (Syamsu & Mandasari, 2026).

Despite these valuable insights, classical and contemporary literature offers little documentation regarding the governance crises that emerge when formal inter-agency coordination completely collapses due to the overlapping interference of informal networks and individual political actors. This study exploits this distinct theoretical gap by evaluating how populist leaders deploy abrupt, repressive regulations to bypass underlying bureaucratic

incapacity. When formal regulatory channels fail to achieve cross-sector coordination, a structural authority vacuum emerges. Rather than resolving this vacuum through long-term capacity building, modern political executives increasingly turn to performative, digital-populist policy measures to project immediate authority in the public sphere.

Utilizing a qualitative document analysis of official legal frameworks and state databases, this paper examines the structural relationships between sudden policy implementation by central and provincial authorities, the resulting localized authority vacuums, weak administrative oversight, and the ultimate deployment of repressive policies by populist executives. Centering the analysis on the Class C quarrying sector in Bogor Regency—specifically focusing on the front-line districts of Parungpanjang, Cigudeg, and Rumpin—this study demonstrates how radical regulatory shocks become counterproductive.

Because successful public administration depends heavily on institutional trust, effective multi-actor communication, and robust regulatory institutionalization (Pawan et al., 2026), suboptimal governance results extend far beyond the public loss of time and capital. They fundamentally erode the integrity of state institutions, fostering social apathy and systemic distrust in government (Pamungkas & Chairani, 2026) while intensifying the socio-environmental dilemmas surrounding the mining sector (Sumardin, 2025). This study contributes directly to the discourse on Indonesian mining governance and regional development. Ultimately, it urges a strategic pivot away from repressive, performative regulatory measures shielded by digital populism, advocating instead for the gradual cultivation of technical bureaucratic expertise and genuine infrastructure development capable of supporting modern, sustainable governance.

Method

This study employs a descriptive qualitative case study approach to examine the intersection of informal institutions, regulatory policy, and digital populism in Indonesian governance. Qualitative methods are uniquely suited for this research as they enable an in-depth analysis of social and cultural phenomena, providing significant theoretical and practical insights (Alfarizi et al., 2025). By emphasizing the collection of non-numerical data—such as official documents and public discourse, this approach captures how actors interpret, experience, and navigate complex situations (Susanto et al., 2024).

Operationally, this study focuses on a qualitative document analysis of two key regional regulations: West Java Governor's Circular Letter No. 144/HUB.01.01.01/PEREK and Circular

Letter No. 7920/ES.09/PEREK. The empirical scope is strictly bounded to a case study of Bogor Regency, West Java, specifically evaluating the three front-line districts of Rumpin, Parungpanjang, and Cigudeg. Rather than applying a primary Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) framework, this study synthesizes empirical findings from secondary literature that conducted a CDA on the digital policy narratives deployed in the public sphere by the incumbent West Java Governor, Dedi Mulyadi. To substantiate these qualitative findings, the analysis integrates targeted quantitative calculations. This mathematical assessment uses data from official government registries and databases to measure the precise socio-economic impact of these circular letters on the local population.

While the primary goal of this qualitative approach is to advance governance literature by generating context-specific, practical insights (Alfarizi et al., 2025), the method has inherent limitations. Qualitative research can be vulnerable to researcher bias if the analyst is not deeply reflective (Annasthasya et al., 2025). Furthermore, because these studies are highly contextual, their findings cannot be easily generalized, and verifying data quality follows a different logic than strictly quantitative frameworks (Alfarizi et al., 2025; Annasthasya et al., 2025).

Despite these limitations, relying primarily on official documents and structural data is heavily justified by the politically charged nature of natural resource governance. Gathering direct field interviews from officials, private companies, or local citizens in the affected areas introduces significant risks of partisan bias driven by political sympathies, economic affiliations, or livelihood losses. For instance, affected businesses are economic entities driven primarily by revenue; if a regulation disrupts their profit margins, their stated opinions will naturally skew negative. Similarly, citizens whose daily incomes are obliterated by a sudden mining halt will provide deeply emotional, biased feedback. Therefore, by anchoring the methodology in official document analysis, critical discourse analysis of digital statements, and hard census data, this study bypasses these localized, conflicting biases to maintain an objective, structural view of the governance failure.

Result and Discussion

Overlapping Jurisdictions and the Generation of an Authority Vacuum

Indonesian decentralization is marked by a significant legislative milestone: the promulgation of Law No. 23 of 2014 regarding Regional Government. This legislation delineates, distributes, and separates specific rights, responsibilities, and sectoral jurisdictions across different

tiers of sub-national governance. Operationally, Article 14, Verse 1 of this law explicitly divides statutory responsibility over the forestry, maritime affairs, and energy and mineral resources sectors between the central government and provincial administrations.

In practice, however, this legislative shift revoked crucial resource management privileges previously held by regencies (*kabupaten*) and municipalities (*kota*). This legal transition effectively pulled authority away from localized governments (Pramesti et al., 2023), leaving regency and municipal administrations significantly disempowered in managing their own territorial resources. In the forestry and mining sectors, this centralization forced provincial governments to expand their administrative reach, coordinating complex resource logistics across vast regional jurisdictions without possessing adequate localized oversight infrastructure.

This re-centralization trend is visible across various resource management sectors in West Java. For instance, prior to 2017, Class C mining permits were issued locally by the Indramayu Regency administration, but post-2017, licensing authority shifted completely to the West Java provincial administration (Rasji, 2020). These cumulative legal updates demonstrate that the shift away from absolute local autonomy is a steady, institutionalized effort toward administrative re-centralization, originating with Law No. 23 of 2014 and extending through subsequent legislative frameworks up to Law No. 2 of 2025.

However, this structural re-centralization has not been accompanied by necessary capacity development among localized state apparatuses. Regardless of the central state's macro-political objectives, the physical mechanics of governance on the ground reveal a starkly different reality. In Bogor Regency, natural resource extraction remains highly lucrative, driving local communities to participate directly in the harvesting and transportation of raw materials as a primary economic survival mechanism. For example, the pervasive operation of Unlicensed Gold Mining (*Pertambangan Emas Tanpa Izin/PETI*) around Mount Pongkor serves as a critical financial lifeline for vulnerable groups (Silas et al., 2025).

Similarly, within the Class C mining sectors of the Rumpin and Cigudeg districts, local residents routinely overlook acute health risks and a lack of basic welfare facilities—such as clean water—in favor of immediate financial gains from raw material extraction (Windani et al., 2023). While the Rumpin and Cigudeg mining sites supply vital materials for macro-development initiatives like the Jakarta Bay reclamation project, the local socio-environmental cost is

devastating, leaving over 10,000 residents suffering from respiratory infections (Windani et al., 2023).

Ultimately, these dynamics prove that the implementation of re-centralization is deeply fractured. Suboptimal regulatory execution, paired with weak oversight, has failed to halt unregulated extraction; instead, it has triggered a distinct "authority vacuum" on the ground. By stripping local regencies of formal enforcement powers without establishing functional provincial field oversight, the state has inadvertently allowed powerful regional informal institutions to proliferate. Consequently, this structural vacuum is filled by informal actors—ranging from unlicensed mining operations to local citizens who adapt to the legal gridlock. Enticed by the economic potential of working as miners and logistics truck drivers (Windani et al., 2023).

Policy Contradictions and Digital Populism: A Critical Discourse Analysis

The contemporary provincial authority over quarrying and Class C mining is further reinforced by Law No. 2 of 2025. Article 35, Verse 1 of this legislation stipulates that mining activities must proceed based on business permits (*Izin Usaha*) issued by the central government, with Verse 5 establishing that this licensing system is managed electronically by central authorities. However, Verse 4 introduces a critical administrative loophole, stating that the central government "may delegate" (*dapat mendelegasikan*) these permitting rights to provincial governments in accordance with statutory provisions.

While this provision cements the statutory dominance of the provincial tier, this legal reinforcement has not been matched by internal institutional capacity building. Consequently, the structural authority vacuum persists. When this vacuum triggers public scrutiny, regional authorities routinely bypass long-term bureaucratic development, opting instead for highly volatile, contradictory regulatory directives and repressive enforcement measures enacted in collaboration with external bodies like the National Armed Forces (TNI) (Silas et al., 2026).

This regulatory volatility is starkly evident in the rapid succession of provincial directives issued in late 2025. On September 19, 2025, the West Java provincial government issued Circular Letter No. 144/HUB.01.01.01/PEREK. The primary directive of this letter restricted mining production and sales to 50% of each company's established Work Program and Budget (*Rencana Kerja dan Anggaran Biaya/RKAB*), specifically targeting operations across the front-line districts of Parungpanjang, Rumpin, and Cigudeg.

Remarkably, just six days later, on September 25, 2025, the provincial government abruptly shifted its strategy by issuing Letter No. 7920/ES.09/PEREK. Citing unresolved "problems related to environmental and safety aspects resulting in disruption of public order, congestion, pollution, damage to road and bridge infrastructure, and the potential for accidents," this new directive completely suspended all mining activities across the three districts. In its appendix, the letter listed the targeted corporate entities: 6 companies in Rumpin, 19 in Cigudeg, and 1 in Parungpanjang.

On September 27, 2025, West Java Governor Dedi Mulyadi anchored this regulatory shift in a public narrative, stating: *"We want everyone to benefit. No one should profit while others lose. Let's work together to protect nature and the environment, and let's strive for mutual benefit"* (HUMAS JABAR, 2025).

Synthesizing secondary scholarly findings that apply Teun A. van Dijk's Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) framework to Dedi Mulyadi's governance communication reveals the strategic utility of this rhetoric. Dedi Mulyadi's digital policy communication relies on framing practices that construct a sharp dichotomy between the "good people" and "disturbers of order" (Suryakusuma et al., 2026). Within the context of the mining closures across the three districts in Bogor Regency, the "good people" are framed as vulnerable citizens negatively impacted by extraction activities who require a political savior, while the "disturbers of order" are cast as the mining operators and logistics companies. This performative populism leverages crisis narratives and emotional expressions to position the public as passive victims and the executive leader as a dominant actor delivering swift, decisive interventions (Suryakusuma et al., 2026).

Through the lens of Van Dijk's framework, this study demonstrates that Governor Mulyadi's "common good" narrative functions primarily to mask the underlying authority vacuum. The sudden transition from a 50% production cap to a total operational shutdown within six days exposes a deeper reality: the formal provincial bureaucracy lacks the technical and supervisory capacity to enforce nuanced, day-to-day regulatory oversight or monitor compliance with the original restriction rule. Caught between systemic incapacity and intense public pressure, the provincial administration faces a political necessity to deploy abrupt, repressive closures wrapped in a digital populist discourse of collective well-being. Ultimately, this digital strategy serves as a critical arena for shaping public social awareness (Suryakusuma et al., 2026), leveraging performative legitimacy to conceal structural governance failures.

Empirical Proof of Policy Counterproductivity and Local Livelihood Marginalization

While the provincial administration shielded the total operational closure behind a rhetoric of environmental protection and collective well-being, the sudden and repressive enforcement of the policy failed to account for the local socio-economic fabric. In reality, the local community remains deeply dependent on the Class C mining industry as its primary revenue source and survival mechanism due to a lack of sustainable alternative employment.

The immediate result of the shutdown was a severe regional economic shockwave. To mitigate this disruption, authorities announced a social aid relief program divided into four waves of distribution. Although official directives failed to explicitly state the exact number of unique families whose livelihoods were disrupted by the closures, the regional administration determined a necessity for a total aid volume equal to 20,241 household. The first wave of this relief program allocated approximately Rp3 million per household to 2,938 heads of families (Badan Kesatuan Bangsa dan Politik Provinsi Jawa Barat [KESBANGPOL JABAR], 2026). However, demographic baseline data indicates there are 49,594 households in Rumpin, 45,523 in Cigudeg, and 40,616 in Parungpanjang (Badan Pusat Statistik Kabupaten Bogor, 2025), culminating in a combined population of 135,733 households across the three affected districts.

A direct mathematical calculation exposes the severe inadequacy of this intervention:

$$\text{Social Assistance Coverage} = \frac{20,241}{135,744} \times 100\% \approx 14,9\%$$

This empirical estimation proves that the total social assistance package covers approximately 15% of the households across these three districts. Ultimately, these data validate the argument that sudden, radical regulatory shifts driven by performative politics are highly counterproductive. The findings corroborate the assertion that the state routinely deploys repressive mechanisms that frame mining communities as lawbreakers while leaving the root causes of mining dependence—namely systemic poverty, restricted employment access, and unequal resource distribution—completely unaddressed (Silas et al., 2026). This disparity reflects a persistent governance failure to provide fair, inclusive, and sustainable community mining frameworks. Instead of solving the structural crisis, these populist measures drive vulnerable communities deeper into structural poverty, while informal networks merely pause, readjust their operations to survive the temporary political theater, or relocate their extractive activities to adjacent regions.

Limitations and Directions for Future Research

This study is subject to deliberate parameters that present opportunities for future academic inquiry. First, the empirical focus is tightly restricted to the localized events unfolding within Bogor Regency, specifically focusing on the Rumpin, Cigudeg, and Parungpanjang districts. Consequently, these findings remain highly contextual to the regional political dynamics of West Java. Future scholarship should expand upon this framework by investigating whether the deployment of repressive resource policies, the performative use of digital spaces to advance populist agendas, and the masking of underlying bureaucratic incapacity occur in other resource-rich regions across Indonesia.

Second, this analysis focuses exclusively on the policy communication and digital narratives generated by the incumbent Governor, Dedi Mulyadi. In reality, the regional governance landscape features competing narratives from local individuals, non-profit organizations, private enterprises, academic institutions, the regional legislative branch (*DPRD*), and other executive officials. Future research should map the discourse of these diverse actors to capture a more comprehensive, multi-vocal overview of the political contestation surrounding Class C mining operations. Furthermore, this analytical scope can be expanded to incorporate external actors across different regions and varying levels of administration who have actively intervened in or commented on these policy developments.

Finally, while this study relies on baseline state documentation to evaluate the initial rollout of the social assistance package, there is a critical need for longitudinal field research to examine the actual delivery of this relief. Future policy evaluation should investigate the structural gaps in distribution, focusing on the exclusion of eligible, affected households from the registries. Furthermore, empirical research must audit whether the actual quantity, monetary value, and total volume of the distributed aid align with the state's initial statutory stipulations, or if administrative gaps further exacerbated the marginalization of local livelihoods.

Conclusion

This study demonstrates that the disruptive regulatory events unfolding within Bogor Regency—specifically afflicting Class C mining operations across the Rumpin, Cigudeg, and Parungpanjang districts—are direct consequences of a structural authority vacuum generated by a fractured administrative re-centralization process. This oversight vacuum has institutionalized a pervasive regulatory gap, resulting in unregulated extractive practices and a profound socio-economic dependency among local communities on the mining sector due to a lack of viable

alternative employment. When the West Java provincial administration attempted to manage this crisis by issuing Circular Letter No. 144/HUB.01.01.01/PEREK, its rapid reversal just six days later by Ordinary Letter No. 7920/ES.09/PEREK exposed a critical institutional fault line. While the initial circular functioned as a comprehensive normative guideline, the provincial bureaucracy completely lacked the technical and supervisory resources to execute it. Consequently, the administration resorted to a reactive combination of performative digital populism and abrupt, repressive operational closures. This radical policy shock necessitated an immediate state intervention via social assistance packages targeted at a volume equal to 20,241 households for the 2025–2026 period—a relief effort that empirically covers a mere 15% of the total combined households across the three districts.

If left unaddressed, such technical and operational failures in public administration carry severe systemic risks. The suboptimal governance observed in Bogor Regency actively erodes public institutional trust, fractures inter-agency coordination, and intensifies the inherent socio-environmental dilemmas embedded within the extractive sector. Left unchecked, these dynamics stall regional economic development and stifle effective multi-actor communication. Furthermore, these governance failures exacerbate broader vulnerabilities within the contemporary Indonesian political landscape, providing political fuel for sub-national infighting, the systemic reproduction of elite primordial dominance, and the devolution of comprehensive legal frameworks into static, formal planning documents rather than mechanisms for active regulatory enforcement.

The theoretical implications of this study contribute directly to the broader literature on public administration and policy implementation in developing states. By documenting the structural breakdowns within Bogor Regency, this research proves that in the Indonesian context, informal institutions remain highly resilient and deeply distort formal policy execution and governance quality. Practically, these findings serve as an empirical evaluation framework for regional policymakers, offering a diagnostic overview of recent administrative failures. Ultimately, this study recommends that rather than utilizing digital platforms to project a performative populism reliant on crisis rhetoric, state authorities must commit to genuine institutional capacity building and material infrastructure development. In the specific context of Bogor Regency, this requires moving away from counterproductive, repressive policy shocks and prioritizing the immediate construction of dedicated mining logistics roads to sustainably balance regional economic survival with public order.

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Furthermore, the author declares an institutional affiliation through his current employment at PT. Gunung Mas Panema (GMP), a commercial construction and heavy equipment leasing firm. In the course of its standard commercial operations, GMP routinely engages in economic transactions and logistical coordination with corporate entities operating within the Rumpin, Cigudeg, and Parungpanjang. The author explicitly states that he received no direct funding, grants, or financial incentives from PT. Gunung Mas Panema to conduct this study, and the findings, analyses, and conclusions presented herein do not represent the official stance, corporate views, or commercial interests of the company. Finally, the author extends his sincere appreciation to the management of PT. Gunung Mas Panema for providing institutional flexibility, allowing the authorization of research hours during the work week without structural salary adjustments.

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